This paper investigates the interaction between corruption and governance at the sector level. A simple model illustrates how both an increase in regulatory autonomy and privatization may influence the effect of corruption. The interaction is analyzed empirically using a fixed-effects estimator on a panel of 153 electricity distribution firms across 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean from 1995-2007. Greater corruption is associated with lower firm labor productivity, but this association is reduced when an independent regulatory agency is present. These results survive a range of robustness checks, including instrumenting for regulatory governance, controlling for a large range of observables, and using several different corruption measures. The association between corruption and productivity also appears weaker for privately owned firms compared to publicly owned firms, though this result is somewhat less robust. JEL codes: D73, L33, L51, O18
effects of corruption. Two important components of reform have been privatization and the creation of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). This paper analyzes the impact of these reforms with regard to their interaction with national corruption levels. A simple model demonstrates how ownership and regulatory autonomy may influence the effects of corrupt behavior. The resulting propositions are analyzed empirically by considering the productivity of electricity distribution firms in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) over the period 1995-2007. A number of previous studies have focused on the effect of corruption on infrastructure performance. The study closest to the work of this paper is that of Dal Bó and Rossi (2007) , who find that corruption is associated with inefficiency among electricity distribution firms in Latin America. However, these authors do not focus on how this association interacts with regulation and privatization, partly due to a lack of data on regulatory governance.
1 Another set of papers have used recently collected data on regulatory governance to consider the impact of regulatory reforms in more detail, including Gutiérrez (2003a) , Montoya and Trillas (2007) , Cubbin and Stern (2006) , and Zhang, Parker, and Kirkpatrick (2008) . In particular, Andres, Azumendi, and Guasch (2008) produce evidence that better regulatory governance and privatization increase the productivity of electricity distribution firms in LAC.
2 However, they do not consider the role of corruption.
The main contribution of this paper is its evaluation of how the impacts of regulatory autonomy and privatization are related to corruption. The question is empirically interesting because theoretically, the interaction of corruption with these reforms is ambiguous (Boehm 2009; Martimort and Straub 2009) .
Overall, the empirical analysis suggests that regulation by an IRA significantly reduces the association between corruption and inefficiency. Indeed, variations in countries' corruption levels appear to explain a substantial proportion of the heterogeneity in the effects of both regulatory independence and privatization.
The analysis uses annual firm-level data on 153 electricity distribution firms across 18 countries along with detailed measures of their respective IRA's governance. To control for time-invariant omitted variables, the regressions use a firm fixed effects model. The main results are robust to a range of permutations, allowing for firm-specific corruption effects and including a large range of additional control variables. Moreover, the results are robust to instrumenting for the reform variables and corruption. The negative association of corruption and its interaction with independent regulation also remain when two alternative corruption measures are used, one of which is based on firm surveys and the other 1. Other studies include Guasch and Straub (2009) , who examine the effect of corruption on renegotiation, and Estache, Goicoechea, and Trujillo (2009) , who consider the impact of corruption on country-level measures of access, affordability, and quality. Clarke and Xu (2004) take a different approach by considering the effect of reforms on petty bribery to utility firms.
2. For surveys of the empirical literature on privatization in developing countries, see Parker and Kirkpatrick (2005) ; Megginson and Sutter (2006) ; Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami (2008). on observed corruption in Brazil. In contrast, the interaction between corruption and private ownership appears somewhat less robust, with the relevant coefficient losing significance when other corruption measures are used.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the following section, a simple model illustrates how corruption, privatization, and the regulatory structure may interact in their effect on labor productivity. In this model, regulatory autonomy decreases the ability of corruptible politicians to interfere in the regulatory process. Privatization works through a different mechanism: it reduces the proportion of corrupt proceeds that are used to over-employ. Section II describes the data and outlines the empirical methodology used, which is based on estimating a labor demand function. The results are analyzed in Section III, both graphically and econometrically. Details of several robustness checks are provided in Section IV, including the addition of a large range of control variables, instrumentation for key variables, and the use of alternative corruption measures. The section also explores the effect of the relevant variables on measures of quality and prices. Finally, Section V concludes and suggests policy lessons.
I . T H E O R E T I C A L M O D E L
To provide a framework for the empirical analysis, a simple model is constructed that outlines a potential mechanism through which corruption may interact with regulatory autonomy and ownership in its impact on productivity. The model is intended to provide one potential framework for thinking about the link between corruption, labor productivity, regulatory independence, and privatization. It is not meant to suggest that this is the only way in which these variables interact; in reality, the relationship is likely to be multifaceted.
The model is a static game among four actors: society, a regulated firm, and two intermediaries whose role is to supervise and regulate the firm on behalf of society -a politician and a regulator. In this model, corruption is defined as occurring when one or more of the intermediaries collude with the firm in a way that is detrimental to society. Such corruption is made possible by an asymmetry of information between society and the other actors regarding the firm's costs. 3 The model focuses on the amount of labor employed by the firm, L, to produce a required level of output, Q. The focus on labor is reasonable because capital inputs are closely related to both the number of connections and the geographical area of distribution and are therefore treated in the literature on electricity distribution as exogenous in the short run (Neuberg 1977; Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson 1998; Dal Bó and Rossi 2007) . The required output level Q can also be treated as exogenous because it represents the obligation to provide electricity as demanded 3. The model therefore follows a tradition of modeling corruption in a three-tier hierarchy, as in Spiller (1990) and Laffont and Tirole (1991) . Within this literature, other models also consider a situation with multiple supervisors (see, for example, Laffont and Martimort (1999) ), and Estache and Wren-Lewis (2009) argue that it is important to consider the multiplicity of actors involved in the regulatory process.
to a given set of consumers, which is the mandate of the firms in the sample (Dal Bó and Rossi 2007) . Therefore, I consider productivity to be labor productivity in both the model and the subsequent empirical analysis because this is the variable most likely to be under the firms' direct control.
To produce the output Q, the firm must employ at least L(Q) people. From the point of view of society, there is some uncertainty over the number of people the firm needs to employ. With probability n, the firm only needs to employ L(Q) workers to produce Q, but with probability 1 2 n, the firm must employ (1 þ g)L(Q) workers. Assuming an exogenous wage rate w, the firm's total costs are thus either wL(Q) or w(1 þ g)L(Q). The firm receives revenue from society to cover its costs; this revenue may arise fromcharging consumers or receiving a transfer from the government. Society wishes to minimize the revenue that the firm receives on the condition that the firm has enough revenue to cover its costs.
Society has two agents in charge of deciding the firm's revenue, a regulator and a politician, both of whom are aware of the firm's true costs. It is assumed that society can strongly punish agents who set a firm's revenue above (1 þ g)L(Q) because such behavior is against society's interests in all situations. The range between wL(Q) and (1 þ g)wL(Q) therefore represents the discretion given to the supervisors. It is assumed that, to a certain extent, the politician is motivated to act in the interests of society but may also be motivated by promises of personal gain. In particular, I consider a situation in which the firm can make an offer to the politician that involves sharing part of any excess revenue that the firm receives. 4 The politician may either be honest or dishonest, with the probability of dishonesty being f(c), where c is a measure of the overall level of corruption in the country. It is assumed that the probability that the politician is dishonest is increasing in the national corruption level in the country, i.e., f 0 (c).0. If the politician is honest, then he or she will never accept a bribe. If the politician is dishonest, then he or she would rather accept the bribe and attempt to set the firm's revenue at the maximum that he or she can get away with. We assume that information on bribes paid and the firm's true costs are unverifiable "soft" information and hence cannot be credibly transmitted to society. If the regulator is not independent of the politician (e.g., the regulator is located in a government ministry), then we assume that the politician has de facto control of the firm's revenue and that the regulator does not play a significant role. However, if the regulator is independent, then with probability a, the regulator will block any attempt by the politician to set the revenue above the firm's true costs.
5 Consider, for instance, a case in which the firm is over-paying 4. For the purposes of the model, it is not necessary to specify the size of this share. We simply require that the share needed to persuade the politician is sufficiently small that there is always enough money to bribe.
5. We assume that the regulator cannot overrule the politician in the other direction -that is, set revenue high when the politician is not corrupted. In a more general model where this is possible, the creation of an independent regulator would have ambiguous effects with regard to corruption.
for some input and is purchasing this input from a company owned by the politician. If the regulator is within the politician's ministry, then the regulator is more likely to bow to the politician's will to allow the purchase than if the regulator is in an independent organization. The firm's payoff function is such that it wishes to maximize its revenue. If its revenue is greater than its costs, the excess will be split among any bribed agents and parties within the firm. A proportion 0 , p , 1 of the excess revenue that the firm receives is distributed among various actors as "profits", bribes, or greater income for employees. The remaining proportion 1 2 p is spent on employing a greater number of workers than necessary. This remainder represents the part of the pie given to employees whose wages are relatively inflexible and who would otherwise be unemployed and essentially provides the link between the firm receiving excess revenue (through corruption) and over-employment. To keep the model general, I abstract from the exact mechanism through which this split occurs. One possibility is that managers who successfully pursue corrupt activities expend less effort on ensuring efficient employment levels, as in Dal Bó and Rossi (2007) . Alternatively, if the the workers are aware of the firm's true costs, they may need to receive a share of the corruption proceeds to be persuaded not to blow the whistle.
The timing of the game is then as follows:
(1) The firm's true labor needs and the supervisor's corruptibility is made known to all actors except society. (2) The firm may offer a (revenue-contingent) bribe to the politician. (3) The firm's revenue is set. (4) Any excess revenue received by the firm is shared among the relevant parties.
Let us now solve the model for the expected level of labor employed in equilibrium. With probability 1 2 n, the firm is high cost, and hence the labor employed will be (1 þ g)L(Q). In contrast, with probability n, the firm is low cost. In this case, we need to evaluate the probability that the firm is allowed to receive excess revenue. If the politician is honest, then he or she will not accept a bribe, and the firm will receive no more revenue than necessary. In contrast, if the politician is dishonest, then he or she will accept a bribe and attempt to set revenue at the higher level. If the regulator is not independent, then the politician will succeed with certainty, whereas if the regulator is independent, the politician will succeed only with probability 1 2 a. Hence, conditional on the firm being low cost, the overall probability of the firm being allowed excess revenue is therefore f(c)(1 2 a1 IRA ), where 1 IRA is an indicator function that takes the value 1 when the regulator is independent and zero otherwise. Given this situation, the expected amount of labor employed is
In this equation, we can see that the "excess" labor employed is proportional to the average revenue received corruptly. Taking logs and then approximating gives the following equation:
The effect of a change in corruption levels on the log of labor employed can therefore be gathered by differentiating this equation:
Having derived a relationship between corruption and employment, let us now consider the role of policy reforms.
6
Privatization typically involves transferring firm ownership from the state to an organization that is focused on maximizing profits. The change in ownership is likely to create an extra outlet for the firm's excess revenue: owners' profits. In the context of the model, privatization can therefore be viewed as an increase in p.
7
Independent regulatory agencies are independent in the sense that they are not part of a government ministry or subject to direct executive control. Therefore, they are viewed as less sensitive to the will of political elites (Andres, Azumendi, and Guasch 2008) . Their role is to implement regulatory policy, which may include setting tariffs, publishing information on firms' performance, and enforcing agreed standards of quality and supply. In the model above, it is therefore reasonable to assume that this reform creates the potential for the regulator to "block" corrupt political behavior.
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Modeling the two reforms in this way leads to the following proposition: Proposition 1. For a given output Q, labor employed by the firm is increasing in the national level of corruption. Moreover, † (a) This effect is greater if the firm is public rather than private. † (b) This effect is smaller if the regulator is independent.
6. For the purposes of this model, we abstract from the reasons why these reforms are implemented. Because corrupt politicians may lose out from the reforms, one potential explanation is that these reforms are a response to pressure from outside actors, including citizens and international bodies. See Section 4 for a brief discussion of such motivations.
7. This effect is similar to the effects of privatization in Shleifer and Vishny (1994) , where privatization decreases the relative influence of those pushing for excess labor compared to profit-motivated managers. Bai et al. (2000) also discusses why state-owned firms may be required to use their funds to over-employ.
8. An alternative model could consider the idea that a regulator's independence might directly impact the way in which rents are shared within the firm in a way similar to privatization. For example, more transparent regulation may reduce the rents that workers obtain from holding more information than owners or politicians. In such a model, greater independence could then reduce the impact of corruption on labor productivity without an effect on revenue. However, such a model is not investigated here because revenue setting is generally considered to be a regulator's primary role.
A rise in the national corruption level increases the probability that the firm will be able to bribe the politician. This situation then increases employment because part of the gains that the firm makes from this corruption will be shared with labor through excess employment.
Privatization reduces the effect of corruption in this model because fewer of the corrupt gains are distributed to workers through excess employment. Note, however, that privatization does not reduce the amount that the firm receives as a result of corrupt behavior; hence, consumers and taxpayers do not benefit directly from this increase in productivity. An IRA's creation reduces the politician's power and diminishes the effect of the politician's corruption on productivity. The interaction between corruption and IRA creation is therefore negative.
Overall, the model provides a simple framework for considering the potential relationship among corruption, labor productivity, and infrastructure reforms. An important point is that the model does not generate welfare implications. Because any change in productivity also results in a redistribution of revenues, reforms may simultaneously increase productivity and decrease welfare.
In this section, we move to the empirical analysis. After describing the data sources used, we describe the econometric methodology, followed by a discussion of the identifying assumptions and the manner in which we should interpret our results.
Data
The empirical analysis is based on the electricity distribution sector in countries in Latin America and the Caribbean from 1995-2007. The electricity distribution sector has many of the properties that are typical of network infrastructure, including close government regulation and limited direct competition. Moreover, the period includes a number of important reforms as well as substantial variation in the level of corruption, both within and between countries.
Data on firm performance are from the World Bank Latin American and Caribbean Electricity Distribution Benchmarking Database. This database contains data on 249 utilities across 25 countries between 1995-2007. Overall, the firms represent 88 percent of all electricity connections in the region. Each utility firm operates in only one country. The main analysis uses data on the total number of employees, the total number of connections, total electricity sold (in GWh), and whether the firm is privately managed. Summary statistics of the firms' characteristics are provided in Panel A of Table 1 .
Data on corruption are from the International Country Risk Guide, which contains annual country-level data. I use this dataset because it is specifically designed to allow for comparisons between years and countries and contains observations for the entire period for which there are data on firms' performance. The ICRG corruption index is designed to capture the likelihood that government officials will demand special payments and the extent to which illegal payments are expected throughout government tiers as ranked by panels of international experts. The ICRG index ranges globally between 6 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). To clarify the results, I reverse the ordering of the data such that greater values represent higher levels of corruption, and I transform the data such that the mean level of corruption in the total sample is 0. A positive value therefore represents an environment in which corruption is above the sample average, whereas a negative value represents a level of corruption below the sample average. Panel B of Table 1 provides summary statistics of the variables by country. Data on regulatory governance are from Andres et al. (2007) and include information on national electricity regulators in more than 20 countries as well as information on provincial regulators for certain states in Brazil and provinces in Argentina. The data are compiled from a survey containing more than 50 different questions to produce indices of various aspects of regulatory governance, including accountability, autonomy, and transparency. These include questions such as whether the regulator is financed directly by the government, whether minutes are available publicly, and the way in which the head of the agency is appointed. I primarily use the Electricity Regulatory Governance Index (ERGI) constructed by Andres et al. (2007) , where a rating of 0 represents the worst possible measure of governance and 1 represents the best. For Argentina and Brazil, I use data on the provincial and state regulatory agencies because the regulation of electricity distribution firms is conducted at this level. Henceforth, the term "province" means the area for which the regulatory agency is responsible (the country, state, or province, as appropriate). Panel C of Table 1 provides summary statistics of the regulatory governance index (ERGI) and when the agencies were created. The data are cross-sectional, but because they include the year in which each regulatory agency was created, I transform the data into a panel by giving zero values to all variables in each year before the agency's creation.
9
In total, these three data sources combine to create a database of 153 firms across 18 countries with a total of 1,359 observations (this is the largest possible intersection of the three datasets). Panel C of Table 1 shows the number of firms of each type in each country. Of the 153 firms, 53 change ownership over the period (all but three from public to private), whereas 66 begin in the sample without a regulator and then become regulated.
Econometric Methodology
Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1998) note that although productivity in electricity generation is mainly determined by technology, productivity in distribution is 9. I am therefore implicitly assuming that regulatory governance remains constant during the reign of the agency and that it is unrelated to the quality of regulation prior to the creation of the agency. This is obviously a strong assumption, but if it has any effect on my results, it is likely to bias them toward insignificance. Therefore, it should not be of great concern when interpreting the results. largely driven by management and efficient labor use. Moreover, because electricity distribution is highly regulated, decisions on technology and capital are likely to be outside of the firm's control, whereas the firm typically has control over labor. I therefore focus on labor productivity. Electricity distribution firms in the sample have the obligation to meet demand. We can therefore consider the amount of electricity sold to final customers and the number of final customers served to be exogenous outputs.
I follow Dal Bó and Rossi (2007) in estimating a parametric labor requirement function. In particular, I use a translog functional form because it provides a good second-order approximation to a broad class of functions. Included in this function are the number of electricity connections the firm serves and the amount of electricity it sells. This equation for a panel of i ¼ 1, . . ., N firms producing in c ¼ 1, . . ., C countries and observed over t ¼ 1, . . ., T periods may therefore be specified as follows:
where l, y 1 , and y 2 are the natural logarithms of labor, sales, and customers, Cor is the level of national corruption, Pri is a dummy variable for private ownership, IRA is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is regulated by an IRA, the v and b terms represent the coefficients on the variables, and 1 is the random error term. Because each firm is present in only one country, there is a unique mapping from firm i to country c. Firm fixed effects are included to control for any time-invariant unobservables, represented as a i in the equation above.
10 Because each firm is present in only one country/province, this approach controls for any time-invariant unobservables at the country/province level. Hence, the corruption and regulation terms are estimated based only on changes in these variables within countries/ provinces over time. To account for time effects in a flexible way, I include year fixed effects c t . The year fixed effects measure the productivity impact of sectorlevel shifts over time, such as secular technology trends, international macroeconomic fluctuations, or energy price shocks. Standard errors are clustered on 10. In addition to electricity produced and connections, Dal Bó and Rossi (2007) also include the service area as an exogenous output and transformer capacity and the length of the distribution lines as exogenous capital variables. Unfortunately, the first two of these variables are not available in the extended dataset used here, and including the latter reduces my sample by more than half. However, because these variables vary little over time, they are likely to be controlled for by using firm fixed effects. I test for this by performing the regressions with the length of distribution lines included in the translog function and find the variable to be insignificant, with no significant changes in my results. Moreover, using the dataset from Dal Bó and Rossi (2007), I find that their results are insensitive to the removal of the service area and transformer capacity from the labor demand function. country-year combinations to address the concern that the shocks affecting firms in a given country in the same year may be correlated.
Overall, the estimated equation resembles Equation (2) from the theoretical model. Proposition 1 predicts that b 1 .0 and b 2 ,0, with jb 1 j.jb 2 j and b 3 . 2 b 1 . Although the model also suggests that there should be an interaction between ownership and regulation, unfortunately, this cannot be analyzed empirically in this study because there are very few observations of unregulated private firms in the sample.
Discussion
The identification strategy described above exploits variation over time in corruption and infrastructure reforms. This variation may be driven by a range of factors, including changes within government, the number of years since the government has been elected, and policy makers learning about best practices.
11
Because we cannot precisely identify the causes of such variation, we must be cautious when drawing inferences from the results. In particular, factors that lead to variations in corruption and reform may also affect firms' productivity in other ways. To the extent that such alternative channels are observable, we can rule them out by adding extra control variables. I undertake such robustness checks in Section IV. However, a particular concern may be that countries carry out the observed reforms as part of a package of changes designed to improve performance or reduce corruption, and other (unobserved) parts of the package may thus have a significant impact. If this is the case, we cannot identify how many of the resulting productivity changes are the results of the measured reforms and how many of these changes relate to other parts of the reform package. Thus, when interpreting the results, it is important to bear in mind that it is not necessarily the particular aspect of reform measured that is driving changes in productivity, and it should not be assumed that the reform in question would have exactly the same impacts elsewhere (Joskow 2005) . Nonetheless, it is useful for guiding both policy and future research to understand whether significant changes in productivity have accompanied these sector reforms. If the aspects of reform measured here explain significant productivity changes better than other observables, this brings us closer to understanding how policy can affect firm performance.
A second concern that may arise with the outlined methodology is the risk of reverse causality, which would arise if changes in firms' productivity affected our independent variables. In the case of corruption, reverse causality seems unlikely to be a concern. Sector-specific shocks will generally not affect country-level corruption, whereas economy-wide shocks are likely to be captured by the use of control variables such as GDP per capita in Section IV. However, reverse causality could be a problem in the case of sectoral reforms because under-performing firms might encourage such reforms. However, this is likely to be more of an issue over the longer term because reform decisions are unlikely to be strongly influenced by poor performance over a small number of years. This issue is therefore unlikely to bias our results given the use of firm fixed effects. However, to check for reverse causality, an instrumental variable approach is used in Section IV.
Finally, it should be noted that in the model above, corruption and infrastructure reforms are treated as independent of one another. In reality, the two may well be correlated -for example, corrupt governments may reform less, or corruption may be reduced through a broad package of regulatory reforms. For our empirical methodology, however, this is not a serious problem because both variables appear simultaneously on the right-hand-side of our regression.
Before beginning the econometric analysis using the methodology described above, we present the data graphically to consider the links among inefficiency, corruption, and regulatory governance.
Graphical Analysis
For this subsection, inefficiency is measured by regressing the log of employees on the translog function described in the first line of Equation (4) and storing the residuals.
12 This creates a measure of "excess labor", which gives us an idea of how productive the firm is in any year compared to the average of all firms over the whole period. Figure 1 plots excess labor against corruption separately for firms in four different environments. The upper two panels consider observations of firms operating under either no IRA or a "bad" IRA (i.e., below-median ERGI score), whereas the lower two panels consider observations of firms operating under "good" IRAs (i.e., an above-median ERGI score). These pairs are then divided into publicly operated firms on the left panel and privately operated firms on the right.
Both reforms appear to affect the relationship between corruption and inefficiency (figure 1). The upper left panel, where firms are publicly owned and not regulated by an above-average IRA, shows the clearest positive relationship between corruption and inefficiency. The upper right and lower left panels show that the relationship between corruption and inefficiency is weaker for firms that are either privately operated or regulated by an IRA with above-median governance. Moreover, there appears to be no clear relationship between corruption and inefficiency when both of these reforms are undertaken, as shown in the lower right panel. I now investigate these results more formally using an econometric analysis.
12. Firm and year fixed effects are not included in this graphical analysis.
Econometric Analysis
The results of the econometric analysis outlined in Section II are presented in table 2. The coefficients on the translog function and year dummies are not reported to save space. It is worth noting that coefficients on the terms in the translog function are reasonable, suggesting that firms have increasing returns to scale.
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The coefficients on the translog function are very similar if the sample is split into private and public firms, supporting the assumption that the translog function is relatively unaffected by ownership.
Column (1) of table 2 explores the association between corruption and productivity. We can see that the coefficient on the corruption term is positive and strongly significant, which suggests that higher corruption levels accompany a greater number of workers employed for a given function of outputs. However, we also see that corruption interacts significantly with both the private FIGURE 1. Inefficiency and Corruption by Ownership and IRA Governance Notes: Excess labor is the residual when labor is regressed on the translog function of firm outputs. An IRA is categorized as "bad" or "good" depending on whether its ERGI score is above or below median. The points plotted are averages across firms for a given country-year after observations have been divided according to their ownership and regulation.
Source: Author's analysis based on data from the World Bank and the International Country Risk Guide.
13. The coefficients suggest that if both output measures were to double, then the increase in labor required would be 59 percent. This is very close to the value obtained using the data from Dal Bó and Rossi (2007) , which suggest that a doubling of outputs requires a 62 percent increase in employees.
TAB L E 2 . Baseline Regression 
The dependent variable is ln(labor employed). In all cases, a translog labor requirement function is estimated with year dummies and firm fixed effects. To save space, the technological parameters of the translog function are not shown. Country-year clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients shown in italics are the mean effects across firms/countries, with standard errors calculated accordingly. ***Significant at the 1 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, *Significant at the 10 percent level. Source: Author's analysis based on data from the World Bank and the International Country Risk Guide.
ownership dummy and the dummy indicating the presence of an IRA. In both cases, the coefficient is negative and of a smaller magnitude than the coefficient of corruption. This finding suggests that the negative relationship between corruption and productivity is significantly reduced if the firm is either privately owned or regulated by an IRA. These results are consistent with Proposition 1 in the theoretical model above.
14 It is also informative to consider the terms that do not involve corruption. The coefficient on the IRA dummy in column (1) is insignificant. Given that corruption is scaled such that its mean sample value is zero, this finding suggests that the creation of a regulatory agency has no effect on productivity if corruption is at the average sample level. The significant coefficient on the private dummy suggests that private firms are more productive than public ones at average corruption levels.
Column (2) introduces a measure of regulatory governance. The "Bad IRA" dummy indicates the presence of an IRA in the bottom 30 percent of regulators scored on the ERGI, whereas the "Good IRA" dummy represents the presence of an IRA that has an ERGI score in the top 70 percent of regulators.
15 It is interesting to note that the coefficient on the "Bad IRA" dummy is significantly positive, whereas that on the "Good IRA" dummy is significantly negative, suggesting that governance is important when considering the link between productivity and IRA creation.
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In contrast, the coefficients on the two terms interacted with corruption are almost identical, suggesting that both types of regulators are equally good at mitigating the effect of corruption. Column (3) displays the results of the regression using a simpler specification in which these two coefficients are imposed to be equal. This column forms the baseline regression for the future robustness checks.
To explore the results further, columns (4)-(6) include a range of dummy variables that I interact with the variables of interest. In column (4), I allow for firms to react differently to corruption by interacting corruption with time-invariant firm dummies. The lack of reduction in the size or significance of the Corruption Â private or Corruption Â IRA coefficients shows that these results are at least partly driven by firms that change ownership or regulation over the 14. The model also suggests that there may be an interaction among corruption, ownership, and regulatory autonomy. However, the introduction of this extra term is found to be insignificant. This result is likely due to the lack of firms in the sample that are privately owned and not regulated by an IRA.
15. The 30/70 split was chosen because it maximizes the difference between the coefficients on the two terms. The difference between the two coefficients, however, remains strongly significant for a range of other splits. I have also tried entering the ERGI directly, which returns similar results. I have explored breaking down the ERGI into different governance components, but no particular component is more successful in explaining firm performance than the ERGI measure. Similarly, no governance component consistently improves upon the IRA dummy when interacting with corruption. See Wren-Lewis (2010, pp. 207-213) for more details.
16. One factor in this result may be the greater commitment ability of well-governed regulators, as detailed by Levy and Spiller (1994). period. Column (5) allows for the effect of IRA creation to vary across countries. The Corruption Â IRA term becomes insignificant here, which suggests that a large part of this result is driven by differences in corruption between countries. In other words, the time variation in corruption is insufficient to give significance to this coefficient, although the coefficient does not change significantly. This finding is unsurprising given that corruption is only measured at the country level and that the variance of measured corruption across countries is greater than the variance within countries. Finally, column (6) allows for the effect of privatization to vary across countries, with the coefficient shown in italics here representing the average effect of privatization across countries. Although the coefficient on the Corruption Â private term falls, it is still statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This finding suggests that the privatization result is only partially driven by differences in the effect of privatization across countries, with a significant portion of this result stemming from a difference in the reaction of firms to temporal changes in corruption levels.
Finally, column (7) shows the results of the regression conducted with country dummies rather than firm dummies. Here, we see that the results remain broadly similar, although the coefficients on the reform variables are more negative. This result suggests that within countries as well as across time, firms that are privately owned and/or better regulated employ less labor.
Let us consider the size of the various effects by studying the coefficients on the variables in column (3). Focusing on the coefficient on corruption, the value of .21 suggests that an increase in the measured corruption of one standard deviation (.82) is associated with a 19 percent increase in the amount of labor employed for a given amount of outputs. However, this finding assumes that the firm is publicly owned and not subject to regulation by an IRA. If the firm is private, then this association is reduced by approximately 40 percent. Alternatively, if the firm is public but subject to regulation by an IRA, then the association is reduced by approximately two-thirds. The average effect across all firms is therefore slightly smaller than that found by Dal Bó and Rossi (2007) , which is consistent with their sample containing a smaller proportion of private firms and firms regulated by an IRA. The importance of governance is also substantial: firms regulated by a "Good IRA" rather than a "Bad IRA" have 25 percent fewer employees.
Overall, three main conclusions arise from this econometric analysis. First, corruption appears to be significantly negatively associated with labor productivity. Second, this association is reduced if the firm is either privately owned or if there exists an Independent Regulatory Agency. Third, firms operating under an IRA with a higher level of regulatory governance operate more productively.
I V. R O B U S T N E S S C H E C K S
In this section, we consider whether the results are robust to changes in the assumptions or methodology. The section begins by introducing extra control variables and then considers an instrumental variables approach. We also investigate the use of alternative measures of corruption, potential impacts on price and quality, and the precise timing of the impact of IRA introduction.
Extra Control Variables
One concern with the above results may be that the variables included are correlated with other omitted variables that affect firm productivity. To check for this problem, other variables can be introduced into the equation, and we can observe whether the coefficients on the original variables are affected.
Because the baseline regression includes ownership and IRA dummies linearly and interacted with corruption, to test for omitted variable bias in these coefficients, I include a range of control variables along with a term interacting each control variable with corruption. These control variables include a number of aspects of the regulatory environment, including the power of the incentive scheme and whether the electricity sector has been vertically disintegrated. I then consider a number of country-level variables, such as GDP per capita, national wage levels, and labor regulation. A selection of these variables and their sources are provided in the Appendix. Key coefficients of the regressions are reported in Columns (1) to (4) of table 3, with the full results reported in the online appendix. Columns (1) and (2) of table 3 report the coefficients on the control variable and the control variable interacted with corruption. We can see that several of these additional variables and their interactions are significant when introduced. However, from columns (3) and (4) of table 3, we can see that the Corruption Â IRA and Corruption Â private terms always remain significant with similar coefficients. Therefore, we can conclude that these interaction terms do not proxy for any other country-level variable. Moreover, the difference between the "Bad IRA" dummy and the "Good IRA" dummy always remains significant. Hence, I conclude that regulatory governance does not proxy for an alternative countrylevel variable.
To test whether corruption is proxying for an alternative variable, I include each control variable and its interaction with both private ownership and the IRA dummy. The results for a selection of the control variables used are reported in columns (5) to (9) of Table 3 . Again, several of the variables and their interactions are significant, but in general, the significance of our terms of interest is not affected. On one occasion in Table 3 , we can see that the coefficient on the Corruption Â private term becomes insignificant. This coefficient becomes negative when the control variable of government surplus/deficit over GDP is included in the regression along with an interaction with private ownership, which may be the result of the sample size being reduced substantially (from 1359 observations to 302), but it may also make us slightly more cautious about the interaction between private ownership and corruption. A plausible hypothesis is that less fiscally responsible governments (i.e., ones with a higher deficit) are associated with inefficient public companies and that privatization has a stronger impact on productivity in these countries than in others. Because these governments are also more frequently corrupt, it appears that we cannot distinguish between TAB L E 3 . Additional Control Variables Control X interacted with corruption Control X interacted with reforms (1)- (4) report the results from the regression where the relevant control variable is interacted with corruption, and columns (5)-(9) report the results from the regression where the relevant control variable is interacted with the reform variables. The regression used is as in column (3) of Table 2 . The columns report the coefficients on the relevant variables, with X representing the control variable. See also notes to Table 2 . ***Significant at the 1 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, *Significant at the 10 percent level. Source: Author's analysis based on data from the World Bank and the International Country Risk Guide.
whether corruption or the government's deficit is a better variable to explain the heterogeneous impact of privatization. However, we can say with some confidence that there is no evidence that an alternative control variable would explain heterogeneity in the impact of IRA introduction better than corruption. Overall, therefore, I can conclude that the results are unlikely to be driven by omitted variable bias.
Instrumental Variables
One way to control for the potential endogeneity of the key explanatory variables is to use an instrumental variable approach. Therefore, this subsection tests the robustness of the results to instrumenting for the potentially endogenous variables: ownership, regulatory governance, and corruption. Instruments are chosen on the basis of being strong correlates of the variables in question and being most likely to meet the exclusion restriction (of not having an alternative channel through which they affect labor productivity). Although the available instruments are imperfect, they may provide some reassurance that the results are not driven by endogeneity problems. Although sectoral reforms were undertaken as a response to sector-specific concerns in some cases, in most instances, privatization and independent regulation were part of a wave of reforms that took place across multiple regulated sectors. Henisz, Zelner, and Guillen (2005) show that the factors that push countries toward reform include the number of reforms undertaken by trade partners and competitors as well as pressure from international donors. In the case of Brazil, for example, Prado (2012) describes how a combination of political factors and international trends led the government to undertake similar reforms across various regulated industries. Given that a large amount of the variation in the timing of reforms comes from factors that are not specific to the electricity sector, we can instrument for our reforms using indicators of reform in other sectors. In this way, we can remove any bias in our estimates that result from sector-specific endogeneity, such as electricity reform prompted by firm performance or omitted variables at the sector level.
To instrument for regulatory governance, I use measures of regulatory governance in two other sectors: telecoms and water. For the telecoms sector, I use an index of regulatory governance constructed by Gutiérrez (2003b) .
17 Firm performance in the electricity sector is unlikely to influence regulatory governance in other sectors, and regulation of these sectors is unlikely to affect the electricity distribution sector through any means other than the effect through regulation. It is difficult to find a suitable instrument for firm ownership because this is a firm-level variable and because other available firm-level variables are likely to affect productivity directly or to be affected by productivity. Therefore, I mustuse an instrument that is measured at the province or country level. I use 17. For water, I use a simple dummy that indicates whether an IRA exists, which I take from Estache and Goicoechea (2005) . dummy variables indicating whether private participation exists in various other infrastructure sectors in the province. 18 This approach provides an indication of a province's tendency to privatize network infrastructure, which is generally unaffected by the performance of the electricity distribution sector. Because these private projects occur outside the electricity sector, they are unlikely to affect electricity distribution productivity through other channels.
In their study of corruption on labor productivity, Dal Bó and Rossi (2007) find no evidence that corruption should be treated as an endogenous variable, arguing that reverse causality is unlikely to be a problem due to the relatively small size of the electricity sector in the overall economy. Nonetheless, I also instrument for corruption because we cannot rule out any potential endogeneity. The instrument used is a measure of freedom of the press, with the assumption that countries with greater press freedom have lower corruption. 19 For the exclusion restriction to hold, we must also assume that press freedom does not affect electricity performance other than through corruption. Such an assumption may be reasonable if we believe that the press may report on poor electricity performance that results from corruption but that the press is unlikely to detail poor performance resulting from other factors that are typically more technically complex.
Estimation is undertaken using the two-stage least squares estimator, with each of the instruments and their appropriate interaction terms included in the first-stage regression. The F-statistics from the first-stage regressions suggest that the instruments are fairly strong, except for private ownership. 20 Whereas the F-stat for the first-stage regressions of the other terms range from 12.14 to 27.13, the first-stage regression for the ownership dummy has an F-stat of 9.31, and the first-stage regression for the ownership dummy multiplied by corruption has an F-stat of 1.61. This is perhaps unsurprising given the difficulties of instrumenting for interaction terms between two variables and the fact that ownership varies at the firm level, unlike any of the instruments. Nonetheless, it may suggest that we should be more cautious when interpreting the coefficients related to private ownership.
The results are presented in column (1) of table 4. From this, we can see that the coefficients keep the same sign as in the baseline equation, and the terms previously found to be significantly different from zero generally remain so. Two exceptions are the coefficient on the "bad regulator" dummy and the coefficient on private ownership, which are now both insignificantly different from zero. However, we still reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on the two regulator dummy variables are the same. The coefficients of the corruption terms are 18. This is constructed from the World Bank's PPI Project Database. The four sectors are water, gas, railways, and sea ports.
19. Evidence for this assumption is provided, for example, by Chowdhury (2004) . Dal Bó and Rossi (2007) use imports over GDP as an instrument for corruption. This is not a strong instrument for the full sample that I use, but when I restrict my sample to the period that they analyze (before 2002), I find that the instrument provides significant results similar to those reported in table 4.
20. The full results from the first-stage regressions can be found in the online appendix.
slightly larger in magnitude than in the baseline regression, but they are less precisely estimated and therefore not significantly different. The lower rows of table 4 present the results of tests of the validity of the assumptions used. These results include the p-value of the Sargan-Hansen test of instrument validity, which suggests that, on the assumption that at least one of the instruments is valid, there are no grounds to reject the assumption that the other instruments are valid. To test whether corruption, regulatory governance, and ownership can be treated as exogenous, the difference of two SarganHansen statistics is calculated, one for the equation in which the possibly endogenous variables are instrumented and one for a specification in which these possibly endogenous variables are added to the instrument set. 21 The p-value resulting from the associated test is 0.21; hence, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that these variables can be treated as exogenous. Alternatively, one can test for the endogeneity of the variables by running a Hausman test comparing the baseline regression with the IV regression, and the obtained results cannot reject the null hypothesis of non-systematic differences in the coefficients. I therefore conclude that it is reasonable to treat all of these variables as exogenous, as in the main analysis. Table 2 . ***Significant at the 1 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, *Significant at the 10 percent level.
21. For more details of this test, see Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2003) .
Alternative Corruption Measures
As stated earlier, I have used the corruption index produced by ICRG because it was designed to be comparable over time within countries as well as between countries. However, there may be concerns that the results are driven by the peculiarities of this index. Therefore, I perform the baseline regression using three alternative measures of corruption, the results of which are presented in table 4.
First, the ICRG index is replaced with an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the ICRG corruption index is above the sample median and a value of zero if it is below. This indicator is largely insensitive to extreme values or small annual changes in the index. From column (2), we can see that the results do not change significantly. Hence, we can be confident that the results are not driven by extreme values in the corruption index.
Second, I use a measure of how significant corruption is as an obstacle to doing business for firms based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys. The measure differs from the ICRG index in that it is sourced from firms rather than experts and that it provides an indication of corruption costs rather than corruption frequency. 22 Moreover, because I have access to the firm-level data, I can construct a measure of corruption for some states and provinces within Brazil and Argentina. Therefore, I do not use country-level indicators for these two countries. However, there are only one or two waves of this survey per country; therefore, I have to fill in missing values. 23 The measure is also scaled to produce comparable coefficients to the measure of corruption used in the main analysis. The regression using this data is presented in column (3). We can see that all coefficients remain similar to those obtained when the ICRG index is used. Although the Corruption Â private term loses significance, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the ratio b 2 /b 1 is as previously found, and these coefficients are as defined in Equation (4).
Third, I use a measure of observed corruption constructed from data on the federal auditing of Brazilian municipalities used by Ferraz and Finan (2011) . The corruption measure is the fraction of audited municipalities in which corruption was detected, varying by state, with municipalities weighted by their population. This variable measures the occurrence of corruption rather than corruption perceptions. This distinction is important if corruption perceptions systematically differ from true corruption levels, as suggested by Olken (2009) . The results are presented in column (4), from which we can see that the Corruption Â IRA term is again significant and negative. Because the measure of corruption is invariant over time, the fixed effects model used here cannot estimate the effect of corruption. However, using a random effects model (not reported here) obtains a 22. See Dethier, Hirn, and Straub (2008) for a survey of the literature using firm survey data on corruption.
23. For locations for which I have at least one observation, I use linear interpolation to fill in missing values between observations and take the value of the observation closest in time otherwise. positive coefficient that is significant at the 5 percent level, with the Corruption Â IRA term remaining negative and significant.
Overall, we can see that the previously identified negative association between corruption and productivity and the mitigating effect of an IRA are robust to using these three alternative corruption measures.
Quality and Prices
One concern with the previous analysis is that the dependent variable, "excess labor", may not have been "excess" but instead may have been employed to raise the quality of outputs. Moreover, it would be useful to know whether the results identified above extend beyond changes in labor employed to changes in consumer prices. Table 5 presents the results of regressing other firm-level variables on corruption, ownership, and regulation. 24 Columns (1) and (2) use two measures of quality, the frequency and duration of interruptions in the power supply, whereas Column (3) shows the percentage of electricity lost through distribution as the dependent variable. In columns (4) and (5), two price measures are given: the tariffs faced (in $) by residential and industrial consumers, respectively. These variables were not included in the main analysis because they are not always observed. Summary statistics of all of these variables can be found in Table 1 .
The results presented in columns (1)-(3) help alleviate any concern that previously noted variations in labor employed may reflect variations in quality. 25 The coefficients involving corruption in these regressions are generally insignificant, suggesting that the corruption-related results found previously are not driven by changes in quality. Moreover, the reforms of interest generally appear to be significantly positively associated with quality.
The coefficients in columns (4) and (5) suggest that the previously noted changes in productivity may correlate with changes in consumer prices. Though generally not highly significant, each coefficient is of the same sign as in the baseline regression. This finding suggests that consumers may be reaping some of the gains of productivity improvements noted previously and gives some weight to the assumption in the model that productivity effects are driven by revenue control methods of regulation. The fact that these coefficients are not as significant as those in the productivity regression suggests that, in addition to consumers, other parties are gaining from the increase in labor productivity. This other party may be the government, because frequently marginal payments to utility firms come from government subsidies. However, this finding may suggest that other actors, such as politicians or firm owners, are gaining at the expense of workers, potentially producing a negative effect on social welfare. 24 . Unlike the prior analysis, I do not regress the dependent variables on a function of firm outputs. Doing so does not affect the results significantly.
25. I also enter each quality variable into the baseline regression and find each to be insignificant, with no significant changes to the other coefficients of interest.
Dynamic Effects
The econometric methodology above is based ona static model. However, we may be concerned that the underlying processes are much more dynamic and that failing to account for this dynamism may bias our results. For instance, if regulatory independence were influenced by corruption in the previous year (controlling for current corruption) and the effects of corruption on productivity were cumulative, then the omission of lagged corruption would bias the coefficient on the independent regulator term. To ensure that the results are not driven by such dynamic effects, I perform a number of further robustness checks.
One particular concern may be that the above results relating to reforms are driven by some other trend in the way that corruption affects infrastructure productivity. To test for this possibility, I perform the baseline regression including country-specific trends and allowing for the effect of corruption to vary over time. In both of these cases, there are no significant changes to the main results. Another test is to consider how the impact of corruption on productivity changes according to when the IRA was created. The results of such an analysis can be seen in figure 2 , which plots the coefficient on the corruption term interacted with indicator variables that depend on the number of years since an IRA was created. Notes: In all cases we are estimating with year dummies and firm fixed effects. Country-year clustered standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, *Significant at the 10 percent level.
The way in which the corruption coefficient changes over time is more consistent with a discontinuous shift at the point of IRA creation than a general trend over time (figure 2). Although it appears that there may be some "expectation" effect in the year prior to IRA creation, it is only after the regulator is created that 0.21 (the estimated coefficient on the corruption term in the baseline regression) is no longer in the confidence interval.
26
In addition to the above, the regressions were performed with lagged terms of each of the dependent variables included, with no significant changes to the results. I also performed the regression clustering standard errors at the firm level, which allows for the error term to be correlated within these clusters. Because the coefficients of interest remain significant, we can conclude that the results are probably not driven by the use of a static model rather than a dynamic one.
Other Robustness Checks
I have attempted other permutations of the baseline equation, including the following: FIGURE 2. Coefficient on Corruption, by Year since IRA Creation Notes: The points represent the estimated coefficient on the corruption term according by the number of years since the IRA was created, with the lines representing the 95 percent confidence interval. With the exception of these terms, the regression was as it was performed in column (1) of Table 2 . The plot for -3 corresponds to the effect of corruption when the regulator will be set up in three or more years time, whereas the plot for 5 corresponds to the effect of corruption when a regulator was set up five or more years ago.
26. Wren-Lewis (2010, pp.204-207) considers in more detail how the effect of IRA creation and privatization changes over time. In terms of privatization, productivity does appear to increase prior to the change in ownership, but the interaction with corruption is insignificant. † Dropping each year and country individually from the sample. † Replacing the variable MWh sold with MWh sold þ losses to reflect varying amounts of electricity lost. † Using a Cobb-Douglas function rather than the translog used above as well as simply using Connections/Employees as a dependent variable. † Using a random effects estimator rather than a fixed effects estimator. † Including the length of the distribution network in the translog function. † Weighting by firm size and splitting the sample into firms that are small (i.e., below the median amount of electricity sold) and firms that are large (i.e., above the median amount of electricity sold).
In each of these permutations, the Corruption, Corruption Â IRA, and Corruption Â private terms remain significant with the expected signs.
V. C O N C L U S I O N
This paper analyzes the relationship between corruption and regulated firms' productivity and the way in which this relationship interacts with policy reforms. The paper sets out a potential channel through which corruption increases labor employed and analyzes how privatization and regulatory autonomy may interact with this mechanism. This approach provides a framework for an empirical investigation of the effect of corruption on electricity distribution firms in Latin America. The econometric analysis shows that corruption at the national level is negatively associated with firm productivity. This result adds to the increasing evidence that corruption can be detrimental to the performance of utilities.
The association between corruption and productivity is smaller for private firms than for public ones. This finding suggests that privatization may be a way to reduce the potentially negative effects of corruption. However, the analysis suggests caution when making this prediction because the significance of this result disappears when I include an interaction between ownership and the size of the government deficit or use corruption measures from alternative sources.
A more robust finding is that the introduction of an Independent Regulatory Agency substantially reduces the negative association between corruption and productivity. This result survives controlling for firm-specific corruption effects and introducing a large range of control variables. Moreover, the result is robust to instrumenting for corruption and sector reforms and still holds when using alternative corruption measures based on firm surveys and observed corruption. Such a result is possibly surprising given that the theoretical literature has generally focused on capture of the regulatory agent as the mechanism through which corruption impacts on regulated monopolies (Estache and Wren-Lewis 2011) .
However, there is reason to be cautious when interpreting the implications of these results. There is not strong evidence that electricity consumers are paying directly for the lower productivity associated with corruption or that that they benefit from the reduced effect of corruption produced by reforms. Although this may simply reflect a lack of sufficient data on consumer prices and government subsidies, it remains possible that a sizable portion of the gains are captured by firm owners or other actors. More data are needed to be able to draw strong normative conclusions about the impacts of the reforms.
Overall, the results emphasize the need to consider institutional weaknesses when developing appropriate sectoral policies. The findings suggest that the implementation of policies considered international "best practices" has different effects depending on the level of corruption in the country. Identifying precisely why this occurs and which aspects of regulatory governance are important in addressing corruption will require further research, through further study of individual countries and through the development of cross-country data on how regulatory governance varies over time. 
